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What was the role of economists in free-market reforms in the late 20th century? By 
investigating the links between economic expertise and neoliberal transitions, Johan 
Christensen’s book, based on a PhD dissertation defended at the European University 
Institute, contributes to a growing body of literature in economic sociology and comparative 
historical sociology (see the works of Marion Fourcade, Sarah Babb, Johanna Bockman, 
Monica Prasad or Elizabeth Popp-Berman), which examines the policy power of economists 
and their ‘ideas’. The author, now Assistant Professor at the Institute of Public Administration 
at Leiden University, delivers on an ambitious agenda: understanding the dynamics of free-
market reforms in four countries (two liberal market economies, New Zealand and Ireland; 
two social democracies, Norway and Denmark) as of the 1970s, and the role that economic 
experts played in advancing them.  
To explore these questions, Christensen has opted to focus exclusively on tax policy. 
Taxation, he argues, represents an ideal case, as there seems to be a widely shared consensus 
in mainstream economics, as of the 1970s, about the goals of tax reform (ensuring the neutral 
allocation of resources), and its means (broadening tax bases, and lowering rates). He uses 
this conventional wisdom as a basis to define what he calls “market-conforming” tax policies, 
which are “not about reducing the level of revenue but…about collecting a given amount of 
revenue in a way that entails the fewest possible distortions to the allocation of resources” (7). 
 Christensen advances two hypotheses to explain the degree of market-conformity of 
post-1970s tax reforms: 1) he relates it to the national organisation of economic expertise and, 
more specifically, to the degree of entrenchment of economic knowledge within national 
bureaucratic structures: when solidly located within the State, economists (and, especially, 
neoclassical economists) could draw, Christensen argues, on their scientific authority and on 
an entrepreneurial administrative ethos to get policy leverage, thus shaping tax reform in 
market-conforming terms; 2) he aims to demonstrate that the power of neoclassical 
economists over tax reforms as of the 1970s built on positions secured within the State by 
Keynesian economists in the postwar period. One of the book’s main strengths is to identify 
concrete channels for economists’ policy influence ; Christensen notably urges us to pay 
attention to economists’ precise locations within the State (and, specifically, to recruitment 
patterns and generational change in ministries of Finances), to the sources of their 
professional authority, and to the modalities of their professional ethos.  
After setting out his theoretical framework in the first chapter, Christensen organises his 
demonstration quite classically. The second chapter maps out the (diverging) tax policy 
trajectories of New Zealand, Ireland, Norway and Denmark. New Zealand and Denmark 
represent both ends of the policy spectrum. From 1984 to 1990, New Zealand embraced 
radical market-conforming tax policies, lowering rates, broadening bases, and increasing 
neutrality in all areas of taxation, while Denmark resisted the introduction of such policies, 
maintaining high tax rates on labour and capital until 2010. In Norway and Ireland, tax 
reforms were less clear-cut. Norway implemented many reforms of the market-conforming 
tax policy package, but kept a very favourable housing tax regime. Ireland’s agressive tax cuts 
on labour and on corporate income in the 1990s were not matched by a subsequent 
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broadening of the tax base. In each of the following 4 chapters, Christensen draws on his 
theoretical model to account for these divergent paths, documenting each case with data from 
interviews conducted with 80 policy-makers, and from a wide range of primary and secondary 
written sources.  
Taken together, the four case studies demonstrate that the varying extent of market-
conforming tax reforms reflects differences in the institutionalisation of economic expertise 
within state bureaucracies. In New Zealand, neoclassical economists, firmly embedded within 
the ministry of Finance, and facing little competition, were instrumental in advocating and 
shaping the country’s swift turn towards pro-market tax policies in the 1980s. Similarly, in 
Norway, Finance ministry economists, in dialogue with scholars and politicians from both 
parties, successfully manoeuvred to change the parameters of the existing tax system in the 
1980s and 1990s. Christensen explains Ireland’s policy of stimulating the economy through 
tax breaks by the narrow presence of neoclassical economists within that state, whose 
structures were primarily staffed by generalist civil servants. Finally, he argues that, in 
Denmark, the fragmentation of economic expertise allowed politicians to dominate tax policy 
formulation, thus limiting the extent of market-oriented reforms.  
By emphasising the varying roles economists play in policymaking, and stressing the 
professional mechanisms which give them policy leverage, Christensen makes a highly 
valuable contribution to the fields of economic sociology and public policy. His account, 
though, leaves certain key questions hanging. 
First, some of the book’s key concepts are not properly defined: who, for instance, counts 
as an “economist”? Christensen never makes it clear whether he defines economists on the 
basis of their graduate (or undergraduate?) degrees, or on the basis of their professional 
positions (e.g economists as occupying positions labelled ‘economist’ or ‘chief economist’ 
within public bureaucracies, or as scholars in economics department). His assumption that 
generalist civil servants, lacking academic credentials in economics, would not be agents of 
market-oriented reforms is highly debatable – in France, for instance, the training of civil 
servants has accommodated economic styles of reasoning as of the mid-1960s, which have 
been shown to play a role in that country’s neoliberal transition in the 1980s. Conversely, the 
ascendancy of financial economics in business education, offering support for market-friendly 
policies, has been solidly documented (Fourcade and Khurana 2013). Deconstructing 
collective entities like ‘economists’, ‘civil servants’ or ‘neoclassical ideas’ would certainly 
have given Christensen’s demonstration more depth.  
Second, channels for economists’ policy influence could, in some instances, have been 
more detailed, or more systematically detailed across cases. Christensen’s focus on ministries 
of Finance—which have attracted little scholarly attention—is most welcome, but the data he 
provides about their institutional designs and the profile of their staff is too sparse for the 
reader to precisely locate economists within their structures. Similarly, given the policy focus 
of the book, I would have liked to know more about the organisation of tax policymaking 
within the ministry (which offices? How are they staffed? How do they work, and with whom 
do they work?). Finally, Christensen provides very few examples of economists’ techniques 
of influence: he mentions economists’ administrative activism, but doesn’t get into much 
detail about how concretely they managed to “persuade leaders” (161) or to conduct 
“ideological campaigns” (61). This would have helped him deliver more thoroughly on the 
“mechanisms of policy influence” aspect of his demonstration.  
However, by bringing together insights from the sociology of professions and from 
public policy analysis to understand the sway of economists, Christensen opens, with this 
book, a very promising area for future research.  
 
 
